This is a non-binding draft term sheet outlining the proposed economic and structural terms of an engagement under which a single senior operator would lead the Bitcoin Storm founding-million marketing programme in its entirety — sourcing, contracting, and managing a cohort of up to fifty sub-affiliates supported by a deputy layer; owning delivery of the one-million-paid-user target within eighteen months.
The engagement is structured as a lead-operator partnership rather than a conventional influencer retainer. The counterparty is expected to operate at the level of a programme lead, not a contracted voice. The compensation reflects this. Final binding terms to be negotiated after mutual NDA and initial discussion.
The Storm is contracting a single lead operator to own the founding-million marketing programme end-to-end. The lead operator has full authority over sourcing, contracting, and managing the sub-affiliate cohort and the deputy layer that supervises it; runs the performance dashboard; and reports directly to the founder.
| Role | Lead Operator — Founding Million Programme |
|---|---|
| Reports to | The founder directly. No intermediate management layer. |
| Primary deliverable | One million paid founding participants, committed at $100 each, within eighteen months of protocol launch. |
| Authority | Full authority over programme execution. Sources, contracts, and manages a cohort of up to fifty sub-affiliates with a six-deputy supervisory layer ($300K deputy pool, see Section 04). Owns campaign calendar, attribution, reporting. |
| Term | Up to eighteen months from protocol launch, OR until one million paid users are secured, whichever occurs first. |
| Editorial independence | Fully protected. No mandated scripts or approved-copy requirements. Standard paid-promoter disclosure as per SEC / FTC / ASA / equivalent. |
The retainer structure is deliberately tied to the metric the engagement exists to move. The founder carries the first four months personally — committing $500,000 total to bootstrap the programme; from month five onward, the retainer is funded exclusively from subscription inflow — paid only if users are subscribing.
| Monthly retainer | $50,000 per month |
|---|---|
| Months 1–4 | Paid by the founder personally, from a $500,000 founder-personal bootstrap commitment. The $50,000 monthly Lead Operator retainer is guaranteed regardless of user acquisition performance in these months. The same bootstrap also funds early sub-affiliate retainers and the deputy stipend pool — see Section 02b below. |
| Month 5 onward | Retainer funded from the $5 Operating Fee Reserve — the $5 per paid participant ring-fenced from the $100 entry fee for operations. Paid only if there is sufficient running balance in the Reserve. |
| Running-balance mechanic | Reserve inflows accumulate in a running balance. Good months build the balance; lean months draw from it. As long as the cumulative balance can cover the $50,000 monthly retainer, the retainer is paid in full. If the balance is insufficient in a given month, payment is proportional to available balance. |
| If the kitty is empty | No retainer is paid that month. This is the structural accountability: if users are not subscribing, the money to pay the retainer does not exist, and nobody is obliged to create it. |
| Termination of retainer | Stops automatically when one million paid users are secured, OR at the end of month eighteen, whichever first occurs. |
| Month | New paid users | Reserve inflow ($5 × users) | Retainer paid | Running balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month 5 | 20,000 | $100,000 | $50,000 | $50,000 |
| Month 6 | 12,000 | $60,000 | $50,000 | $60,000 |
| Month 7 | 35,000 | $175,000 | $50,000 | $185,000 |
| Month 8 | 8,000 | $40,000 | $50,000 | $175,000 |
The founder-personal $500,000 funds three things during the first four months. Once the Operating Fee Reserve is established at month five, all three lines transition to OFR funding.
| Lead Operator retainer (4 months × $50K) | $200,000 — full retainer for months 1–4, paid in full regardless of recruitment progress. |
|---|---|
| Sub-affiliate retainer pool (months 1–4) | $90,000 — covers tier-1 retainers for the cohort as it ramps. Realistic burn: roughly $58,000 across months 1–4 (zero in month 1, climbing to ~$40,000 in month 4 as the cohort fills). The buffer above realistic burn absorbs early-contracted sub-affiliates beyond plan. |
| Deputy stipend pool (months 3–4) | $30,000 — covers deputy stipends from approximately month three, when sub-affiliate volume justifies the supervisory layer. Six deputies funded across two months. See Section 04 for the deputy structure. |
| Float / contingency | $180,000 — unallocated buffer for early-contracted sub-affiliates beyond plan, deputies onboarded a month early, audit overruns, unforeseen counsel costs, regulatory advisory work, and any operational surprises. The founder carries this. A 36% float is deliberately generous: it absorbs four months of variability without requiring a top-up conversation. |
| Total founder-personal commitment | $500,000 |
The real upside of the engagement is a single performance bonus paid at Year 5 Bonanza Day, contingent on both (a) the one-million-user target being achieved within eighteen months, AND (b) the protocol settling profitably at Year 5 with sufficient residual surplus available.
| Bonus amount | $12,000,000 USD equivalent, flat, capped. |
|---|---|
| Payable when | Year 5 Bonanza Day — the protocol's single deterministic settlement event. |
| Condition A (user target) | One million paid founding participants secured within eighteen months of protocol launch. |
| Condition B (protocol profitability) | The bonus is paid from Year 5 residual surplus — the profit remaining after the 2,100 BTC purchase and pro-rata participant distribution. To preserve participant capital, the operator's $12M bonus is capped at 15% of residual surplus. For the bonus to be payable in full, residual surplus must be at least $80M. Below that, the bonus pays proportionally — 15% of whatever residual exists. At $0 residual, no bonus is paid regardless of user target achievement. In the high-residual scenarios the protocol is designed to produce, the cap is not the binding constraint — the $12M is. |
| Source of payment | Year 5 residual surplus — profit remaining after BTC purchase and pro-rata participant distribution. Not from Participant Pool capital under any circumstance. |
| If either condition fails | Bonus pays zero. Retainer payments already received are not recoverable. |
| Protocol outcome at Year 5 | Residual surplus | Bonus payable |
|---|---|---|
| BTC threshold exactly met | ~$0 | $0 (no surplus to draw from) |
| Marginal upside — residual ~$40M | ~$40M | $6M operator (15% binds) |
| Modest upside — residual ~$67M | ~$67M | ~$10M operator (15% binds) |
| Threshold for full bonus — residual ~$80M | ~$80M | Full $12M operator |
| Good outcome — residual ~$290M | ~$290M | $12M operator |
| Strong outcome — residual ~$990M | ~$990M | $12M operator |
| 1M users missed by month 18 | — | $0 (condition A failed) |
The lead operator runs a cohort of up to fifty sub-affiliates — too many for a single person to oversee personally without quality drift. The deputy pool funds a supervisory layer: six deputy managers, each overseeing approximately eight sub-affiliates. Deputies are recruited from inside the existing sub-affiliate cohort — high-performing sub-affiliates who have demonstrated audience quality, compliance discipline, and operational reliability.
| Pool size | $300,000 total, across the full eighteen-month engagement. |
|---|---|
| Number of deputies | Six, each overseeing approximately eight sub-affiliates. |
| When deputies come on | Approximately month three, when sub-affiliate volume has reached the level where supervisory oversight is justified. Earlier if recruitment runs ahead of plan. |
| Stipend structure | Deputy stipends are paid on top of the sub-affiliate's existing retainer — the deputy role is a tier-up promotion, not a replacement contract. Approximate stipend: $3,000/month during bootstrap (months 3–4), continuing at ~$2,800/month from month five onward as the OFR ramps. |
| Months 3–4 funding | $30,000 from the founder-personal $500,000 bootstrap commitment (see Section 02b). |
| Months 5–18 funding | $270,000 from the Operating Fee Reserve, paid alongside the lead operator's retainer and sub-affiliate retainers. |
| Selection authority | The lead operator selects deputy candidates from the sub-affiliate cohort and presents to the founder for ratification before promotion. Deputies sign a short addendum to their existing sub-affiliate contract. |
| Sub-affiliate 1 BTC track preserved | Deputies retain their underlying sub-affiliate 1 BTC bonus track. The deputy stipend does not affect their existing bonus eligibility. |
| Deputy Year 5 cohort bonus | Each deputy who completes their full term receives an additional 1 BTC at Year 5 Bonanza Day if their cohort segment (the ~8 sub-affiliates they oversee) collectively delivers at least 60,000 paid users across the engagement. Conditions are the same as the operator's $12M bonus: target hit AND protocol settles profitably. If either fails, the deputy bonus pays zero. Six deputies × 1 BTC = 6 BTC total Year 5 commitment, paid from residual surplus alongside the operator and sub-affiliate bonuses. |
The lead operator has full authority to structure the programme as they see fit within the agreed performance envelope. The Storm provides the budget envelope, the product, the regulatory framework, and the founder's availability. Everything else is the operator's call.
A lead-operator structure places real weight on a single individual. Three contractual safeguards balance that risk without undermining the operator's autonomy.
| Minimum supervisory layer | Operator must have at least three deputies promoted from the sub-affiliate cohort within 90 days of protocol launch (i.e., before the end of month three of operations). This ensures the programme does not collapse to a single-person operation. Operator's choice of deputies, subject to founder ratification. |
|---|---|
| Replacement obligation on exit | If the operator exits the engagement voluntarily before the target is hit (for any reason other than gross breach by the Storm), they must introduce a qualified replacement operator. Bonus entitlement is forfeited if this obligation is not met. |
| Dashboard ownership | All performance data, attribution infrastructure, and campaign records are owned by the Storm, not by the operator personally. If the engagement ends for any reason, continuity infrastructure remains with the Storm. |
| Non-compete carve-out | During the engagement, operator may not take new sponsored engagements with any competing capital protocol, ICP-ecosystem financial product, or directly competing regulated-crypto venture. All existing ongoing sponsored work is grandfathered. |
| Moral conduct clause | Standard industry clause. Conviction of fraud, association with a publicly documented rug pull, or conduct bringing the protocol into disrepute terminates the engagement with no bonus owed. Not triggered by legitimate editorial disagreement or controversial opinion expressed in professional capacity. |